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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the main features in the conduct of monetary 
policy in Brazil. Initially, we focus on the inflation targeting regime, reviewing the 
background that led to its adoption in mid-1999, the institutional framework 
implemented in the country, and the challenges and achievements reached so far. 
Then we move to the analysis of the public debt management, highlighting its 
objectives and results, with particular emphasis on the debt composition and average 
maturity. The third section discusses the open market procedures. The paper ends 
with a brief description of specific policy issues to be addressed by the Central Bank 
in the near future.  
 
                                                           
*  Note prepared for the BIS annual meeting on “Development of Debt Markets in Emerging 
Countries”, Basel, December 2001. Reviewed in January 2002. The authors would like to thank 
Arminio Fraga, Hélio Mori and Gustavo Bussinger for relevant comments on earlier drafts of this 
paper.   
** The authors are, respectively, Deputy Governor for Monetary Policy, Senior Advisor to the Board 
and Head of the Open Market Operations Department at Banco Central do Brasil.   4
 ,QIODWLRQ7DUJHWLQJLQ%UD]LO
 
The inflation targeting regime was introduced in Brazil in July/1999, five and a half months 
after a largely unexpected move from a fixed to a floating exchange rate regime. Since early-
1995, a pegged exchange rate had been the nominal anchor of the Brazilian economy, and the 
country was suddenly forced to find a new “safe harbor”. 
 
Within available alternatives, a pure discretionary monetary policy appeared not to be 
appropriate due to unanchored inflation expectations and the fear of an exchange rate 
overshooting. Inflation targeting, a monetary policy regime characterized by constrained 
discretion (Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997), was considered as the correct policy for guiding 
expectations and for enhancing transparency. This would prevent the temporary inflation hike 
that followed the currency turmoil from moving inflation up in a permanent way. In other 
words, inflation targeting appeared to be the most advisable alternative for monetary policy, 
and in March 1999 Brazil started to move in that direction.1  
 
The key questions at that point were the timing for implementation and the design of the 
institutional framework required for the functioning of the new policy regime. Given 
inflationary pressures triggered by the floating of the exchange rate, the immediate 
implementation of a formal inflation targeting regime carried on many risks. Risks were 
probably heightened as the Central Bank opted for a full-fledged inflation targeting 
framework with all its “bells and whistles”, instead of a more gradual approach. 
 
In addition, the implementation of the new policy framework was to be complemented by a 
deepening of the research effort by the Central Bank. Brazil had barely any previous 
experience in controlling inflation through a forward-looking monetary approach. In the last 
decade, monetary policy had been accommodative. It shifted from operating in a highly 
inflation-indexed environment in the early 90’s, to adjusting current account imbalances 
under a pegged system in the mid-90’s.   
 
                                                           
1 Comprehensive analysis of the currency crises and the move to inflation targeting in Brazil can be 
found in the following papers, all written by Central Bank officials or researchers: Fraga (1999), 
Bogdanski, Tombini, and Werlang (2000), Bogdanski, Freitas, Goldfajn and Tombini (2001) and 
Fachada (2001).     5
At the outset, the implementation of the new policy regime required the development of 
accurate inflation forecasting techniques. With this aim, the newly created Research 
Department of the Central Bank developed several instruments including: structural 
econometric models for the transmission mechanism of monetary policy to prices; non-
structural short-term vector autoregressive models; daily surveys of market inflation 
expectations; alternative measures of core inflation; and estimation of leading indicators for 
inflation. Indeed, this was not a trivial task to be undertaken by a central bank operating in 
such an economy with a volatile inflation background as Brazil’s. Almost three years since, 
the outstanding track record of policy implementation indicates a high degree of success in 
the transition to the inflation targeting regime.     
 
Statistical evidence suggests, as proposed in early assessments (Bogdanski HWDOO., 2000), that 
aggregate demand, exchange rate and inflation expectations are the relevant transmission 
channels of monetary policy in Brazil. The credit channel appeared less significant, as the 
stock of credit outstanding in Brazil was - and still is - relatively low by international 
standards (approximately 27% of GDP in mid-1999). Over the last two years, however, there 
has been growing evidence that the credit channel has acquired greater importance. In part, 
this is due to the Central Bank’s policy aimed at increasing the efficiency of banking 
intermediation, and to lower reserve requirements on demand deposits, which fell from 75% 
in October 1999 to the current 45% rate. 
 
The modeling of the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy to prices enabled the 
Central Bank to simulate the effect of interest rate changes on the level of aggregate demand, 
and consequently, on the inflation rate. It also enabled the simultaneous simulation of the 
direct effects of changes in the interest rate on the exchange rate, and hence on prices. Indeed, 
the structural models showed that interest rate changes affect aggregate demand in a period of 
3 to 6 months. Furthermore, changes in the output gap have an impact on inflation after 3 
months. Therefore, adjustments in the short-term interest rate have impact on inflation after 6 
to 9 months. Interestingly, this is a shorter lag as compared to econometric findings in 
developed countries. For the exchange rate transmission channel, the effect of interest rate 
changes on prices is nearly instantaneous, due to the immediate impact on tradable goods’ 
prices. 
    6
Regarding the institutional arrangements within the Central Bank, the Monetary Policy 
Committee (Copom) is the policy making body which meets on a monthly basis to set up the 
target for the overnight interest rate (the so-called Selic rate). In order to enhance 
transparency, the Committee’s minutes are published with an eight-day lag, discussing 
exhaustively the economic outlook, inflation perspectives and Copom’s decisions. The 
Committee also publishes the ,QIODWLRQ5HSRUW every quarter The 5HSRUW presents inflation 
forecasts through a fan chart, clearly unveiling that projections are conditional on different 
scenarios, thus producing a probabilistic distribution of inflation paths.   
 
The Central Bank is accountable for achieving the inflation targets. In case the target is 
breached, the Central Bank’s Governor has to send an open letter to the Finance Minister 
justifying the breach, and explaining the measures required to bring inflation back to the 
target and the expected timing.  
 
At the start of the new regime, the government announced the inflation targets for 1999, 2000 
and 2001. These were fixed at 8%, 6% and 4% respectively, with a 2% tolerance interval. The 
reason for gradual declining targets is evident. Monetary policy could not thwart the process 
of relative prices realignment triggered by the exchange rate shock. At the same time, the 
government opted for a cautious stance, evidenced in the tolerance interval of 2 percentage 
points. There were two justifications for such an interval. First, the recognition of the high 
uncertainty about the inflation process in Brazil. Second, the IPCA (Broad National 
Consumer Price Index), the reference measure for the target, is a headline inflation index, 
which can be affected by temporary shocks as well as seasonal factors.  
 
The targets are announced two years and a half in advance. For instance, the 2002 target was 
established at 3.5% in June 2000. For 2003, the target was disclosed last June, set up at 
3.25%. Tolerance intervals were maintained at 2% for both years. Targets refer to the full 
year, without any formal intermediate target.  
    
The new framework’s outcome in 1999 was quite satisfactory. Despite the sharp exchange 
rate depreciation, inflation stood at 8.9% within the tolerance interval. This achievement 
could be attributed to the post-devaluation monetary tightening in parallel with a significant 
fiscal tightening through measures envisaging tax increases and spending cuts taken by the   7
government at the end of 1998 and early-1999.2 Inflation expectations were lowered from as 
much as 20% in the aftermath of the devaluation to around 8% in May-June 1999. As soon as 
inflation expectations were under control, market interest rates declined gradually, and the 
Selic rate was reduced from 45% p.a. in March to 19% in December.  
 
Inflation behavior, however, was not as smooth throughout the year. Several difficulties had 
been faced in the pursuit of the 8% target. In addition to the exchange rate depreciation, there 
was a substantial increase in the so-called government-managed prices, which are subject to 
backward-looking price adjustment rules3; in prices of oil derivatives due to the jump in the 
international market; and rise in food prices due to adverse weather conditions. One should 
consider also the market turbulence caused by instability in some important emerging markets 
as well as uncertainties about the working of the new regime itself. Achieving one-digit 
inflation rate at year-end represented an important step forward to build credibility and to 
consolidate the new monetary framework.  
 
In 2000, the developments were more favorable, and the central inflation target of 6% was 
achieved. Again, this positive outcome was obtained despite the ongoing realignment of 
government-managed prices. Accompanying the inflation rate declining trend, the Central 
Bank maintained the gradual reduction of the Selic rate, bringing it down to 15.75% in 
December from 19% the year before. It is worth mentioning that the inflation target was 
achieved in an environment of relatively high growth rates, of 4.4% for GDP and 6% for 
industrial production. Growth was driven by improving consumer and business confidence 
and by credit expansion, boosted by the reduction in reserve requirements for demand and 
time deposits, fall in taxation on credit for households, and reduction in lending rates and 
bank spreads.          
  
                                                           
2 The fiscal outlook in 1998 was certainly one of the major sources of vulnerability that led to the 
currency regime collapse at the beginning of 1999. Contradictorily enough, the measures adopted by 
the government in the second half of 1998, the so-called PEF (Fiscal Stability Program), ended up by 
producing a solid public sector primary surplus in 1999 that helped the implementation of the new 
monetary regime.    
3 In regard to the backward-looking prices dynamics in the period, see Bogdanski, Goldfajn, Springer 
and Tombini (2001). For the accumulated 1999/2001 period, adjustment in administered prices, which 
include oil derivatives, public utilities (electricity, telecom and water and sewage fees), urban 
transportation, housing taxes and health insurance, among others, averaged 48.2% compared to an 
inflation rate of 24.3% measured by the IPCA.   8
In 2001, the monetary policy management was more challenging. At the end of 2000, the 
Central Bank inflation forecast for the year had pointed to a 3.9% rate. The Bank was not 
alone with such a number, as market consensus indicated a similar projection, which proved 
to be rather optimistic. As the Brazilian economy was affected by a series of external and 
domestic adverse shocks, inflation accelerated to 7.7% and GDP growth slowed down. 
 
These shocks included, on the external front, the slowdown in world economy and trade, led 
by a steeper-than-expected slump in the U.S. economy; a continued deterioration in the 
economic and financial outlook in Argentina; and the “flight to quality” of foreign investors 
from emerging markets, shrinking foreign direct investment and capital flows to Brazil.4 All 
these external factors were aggravated by the September 11th events. 
 
Domestically, shocks were also equally destabilizing. Brazil experienced an energy crisis that 
forced the government to implement a severe rationing program in May with detrimental 
impact on public’s confidence. Government-managed prices were adjusted upward for the 
third year in a row, this time magnified by the energy shortage. In the first half of the year, an 
additional pressure on inflation came from a shock, though temporary, in food prices. Finally, 
investors’ confidence deteriorated due to the partial halt of the reform agenda by Congress.   
 
Those unfavorable factors put pressure on the foreign exchange market (Figure 1). From 
January to mid-October, the exchange rate depreciated more than 40%, fuelled by market 
uncertainties about the balance of payments and the hike in Argentina’s sovereign risk 
premium. Even if a low pass-through to inflation is considered, of say 15% in four quarters, 
the magnitude of the depreciation would be high enough to jeopardize the objective of 
achieving the inflation target for 2001.5  
 
The government response to these challenges entailed initiatives on the fiscal, external and 
monetary fronts. On fiscal, the targets for the public sector primary surplus were risen from 
3% of GDP to 3.35% for 2001 and from 2.7% of GDP to 3.5% for 2002. On the external 
front, a new program supported by the IMF was agreed, and the Central Bank disclosed on 
                                                           
4 At the beginning of 2001, the Central Bank predicted FDI to reach US$ 24 billion, already 
accounting for a substantial drop when compared to the US$ 32.8 billion flow of 2000. Actual FDI 
stood at US$ 22.6 billion at year-end.  
5 For a discussion about the pass-through ratio, refer to the March of 2001 issue of the ,QIODWLRQ
5HSRUW, cap. 5, pg. 104 to 106.    9
several occasions time-consistent projections for the financing requirements in 2001 and 




Initiatives on monetary policy included not only rise in the Selic rate to 19% since July from 
15.25% in March and increase in reserve requirements on time deposits (to 10%) since 
September, but also measures aimed at fostering liquidity in the foreign exchange market. 
These comprised the announcement in July of daily sales of US$ 50 million in the foreign 
exchange spot market, totaling US$ 6 billion until the end of year, the increase in the issuing 
of dollar-linked domestic debt, and revision of capital requirements for financial institutions 
regarding their foreign exchange exposure.  
 
Those measures had no instantaneous impact to revert the exchange rate overshooting and to 
control inflationary expectations, but they proved to be appropriate as since mid-October the 
exchange rate appreciated by around 20%. The improved market sentiment was a result not 
only of the monetary initiatives of the Central Bank but also a better prospect for the external 
accounts in 2001 and 2002. Indeed, the trade balance reverted from an accumulated 12-month 
deficit of US$ 1.6 billion in June to an actual surplus of US$ 2.7 billion at the end of the year. 
































deterioration of the Argentine financial outlook that culminated with the resignation of the 
country’s President and a moratorium on its external debt payments in December.  
 
From the developments of 2001, one could conclude that the exchange rate depreciation and the 
adjustment of government-managed prices were the main factors to frustrate the achievement of 
the inflation target, as highlighted in the open letter by the Central Bank’s Governor to the 
Finance Minister and to the public at large.6 Our assessment, however, is that the Central 
Bank’s policy decisions were in the right direction and the inflation targeting proved to be an 
adequate framework to deal with the diversity of difficulties faced by the economy, so that the 
rise in inflation in 2001 would not propagate into coming years’ rate. Market inflation 





At the end of 1999, the National Treasury and the Central Bank announced a series of 
guidelines regarding domestic debt management. These objectives included lengthening the 
average maturity of the debt, increasing the share of fixed-rate securities in total debt 
outstanding and reducing simultaneously the share of dollar and overnight rate-linked 
securities, and fostering the secondary market of public debt. 
 
The most important measures implemented under the guidelines were: (i) to concentrate 
maturities using re-offerings; (ii) to make auctions of long term fixed income securities after 
presentation of firm bids by financial institutions; (iii) to repurchase government securities 
through regular auctions by the National Treasury; (iv) to allow separate trading of principal 
and coupons (strips); (v) to allow financial institutions to hold short positions of government 
securities; (vi) to develop a registration system for forward operations with government 
securities; (vii) to make flexible leverage limits for financial institutions in operations with 
government securities; (viii) to change the selection process of Central Bank primary dealers 
in order to stimulate their market-making ability; (ix) to enhance transparency through 
monthly press releases on public debt and open market operations; (x) to increase 
predictability through an advanced release of monthly auctions schedules; (xi) to introduce 
                                                           
6 The open letter is available at the Central Bank webpage, www.bcb.gov.br/ingles/relinf/inftarget.pdf    11
electronic trading of government securities; and (xii) to organize periodic meetings between 
the Central Bank, the Treasury and primary dealers. 
 
Backed by a sound fiscal policy, these guidelines for domestic debt have produced 
satisfactory results. The average maturity of domestic debt has lengthened to 35 months in 
November 2001 from 27 in December 1999 (Figure 2). In the same period, the share of short 
term (less than one-year) securities in total outstanding declined to 26% from 53% (Figure 3). 
The liquidity in the secondary market has been increasing, albeit at a slow pace, but further 
improvement is expected to occur with the introduction in April 2002 of the new Brazilian 
Payments System, which is designed to mitigate systemic risk. Finally, enhanced transparency 
has helped to lower financing costs for the Treasury and has allowed financial institutions to 
increase their exposure to government securities.  
 
Nevertheless, as noted above, the macroeconomic environment in 2001 was less friendly, 
forcing an upward move in the slope of the domestic yield curve. The Treasury had thus to 
face a trade-off between lengthening the average maturity of the debt or increasing the share 
of fixed-rate securities. The first option was chosen. Simultaneously, the Central Bank 
increased the issuance of dollar-indexed securities in order to contain the exchange rate 


















(below the initial level of December 1999), after growing to 15% in December 2000. As for 
dollar-indexed securities, the share in public debt outstanding peaked in October (32.8%) 
from 22.3% in December 2000 (Figure 4), due not only to the net issuance of bonds but also 
to the exchange rate depreciation in the period.    
 
The currency depreciation, the increase in real interest rate and the deceleration of GDP 
growth in 2001 led the domestic public debt outstanding/GDP ratio to more than 51% in the 
September/October period, from 44.8% in December 2000. Notice, however, that these 
figures are not fully comparable, as the debt/GDP ratio was inflated by a transfer of bad assets 
from state-owned banks (Caixa Econômica Federal and Banco do Brasil) to the Treasury, 
with an estimated impact of around 3% of GDP on debt outstanding.  
 
One should notice, however, that the exchange rate appreciation since mid-October has 
already produced a positive impact on debt outstanding, and the year-end exchange rate was 
below the average issuance rate of R$/US$ 2.44 for the whole year. If sustained, this 
appreciation will tend to reduce the debt/GDP ratio.  
 
On external debt management, which will be a responsibility of the Central Bank until 2003, 
the objectives have been to build up yield curves for the Brazilian sovereign bonds in different 
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placements, and to raise funds at appropriate costs and risk levels. Despite the deterioration in 
the external economic environment in 2001, the market remained open to Brazil’s sovereign 
issues, and the country raised a total of US$ 6.8 billion at reasonable spreads. The external 
debt profile continued to improve, and the share of external debt maturing within one-year fell 
to 8% in June 2001 from 17% in December 1999, while the average maturity lengthened to 9 






Brazil, like most countries adopting an inflation targeting framework for monetary policy, 
uses the overnight interest rate as the instrument in the conduct of monetary policy. The 
Monetary Policy Committee, therefore, sets up the target for the overnight-Selic rate in its 
monthly meetings, and under the Committee’s directives the open market trading desk adjusts 
market liquidity on a daily basis to maintain the effective overnight interest rate close to the 
target.  
 
Open market operations are the main instrument for liquidity adjustment of the system. 















bank reserves. The demand for bank reserves is determined by reserve requirements on 
demand deposits, which despite substantial reduction in the last two years (from 75% to 
45%), are still high compared to international standards. On the supply side of bank reserves, 
factors affecting them are the usual: (i) currency held by the public; (ii) The Central Bank’s 
operations in the foreign exchange market; (iii) tax revenue, government spending and 
budgetary endowments; (iv) placing and redemption of government securities; (v) discount 
window facilities; (vi) reserve requirement adjustments; and (vii) open market operations.  
 
The Central Bank has been operating in its open market desk through repurchase agreements, 
using as collateral National Treasury and Central Bank securities. Outright operations are less 
frequent, as, depending on the traded volumes, they can cause volatility in bonds prices, and 
hence in the yield curve. On a daily basis, the Central Bank forecasts the market liquidity 
needs, that is, estimates whether there is shortage or excess of bank reserves, and carries an 
informal auction aimed at balancing liquidity. Repo tenures usually vary from one to three 
days, and government securities are priced below market prices (with a haircut) to protect the 
lender against credit risk.     
 
The Central Bank carries out the open market operations directly with 25 primary dealers, 
selected twice a year among the more active institutions in the financial system. These dealers 
act as an interface with other market participants, and are chosen according to performance 
criteria, including each institution’s performance in the primary and secondary markets for 
government bonds. As noted, open market operations are conducted only through primary 
dealers, but, differently from other countries, all financial institutions can participate in the 
primary offerings of government securities, besides the primary dealers.  
 
Participation in auctions is restricted to financial institutions keeping an account in the 
6LVWHPD(VSHFLDOGH/LTXLGDomRHGH&XVWyGLD (SELIC), which is an electronic book-entry 
system that controls the custody and registers all operations regarding domestic government 
securities. Thee two parties (buyer and seller) must input every transaction in the SELIC and 
the system makes a two-sided matching of their commands. The seller’s position in securities 
and the buyer’s position in bank reserves are checked. The transaction is settled in a DVP 
(Delivery versus Payment) basis, if and only if securities and cash are immediately available. 
   15
Electronic trading has had a major impulse with the implementation in August 2000 of the 
Sisbex – Trading System of Public Bonds and other Assets – by the Rio de Janeiro Stock 
Exchange. In the second half of 2001, Sisbex accounted for around 20% of government 
securities market turnover, trading that surpassed 30% in the November/December period.  
 
Currently, the most heavily traded bonds issued by the Treasury are the 1RWDGR7HVRXUR
1DFLRQDO  VpULH ' (NTN-D), the /HWUD )LQDQFHLUD GR 7HVRXUR (LFT), and the /HWUD GR
7HVRXUR1DFLRQDO (LTN). The NTN-D is indexed to the R$/US$ exchange rate, the LFT to 
the Selic rate, and the LTN is a discount bond. The Central Bank, on the other hand, issues 
only the 1RWDGR%DQFR&HQWUDOVpULH( (NBCE), which presents the similar features as the 
NTN-D. More recently, the Central Bank interrupted the issuing of NBCE, anticipating a 
requirement of the Fiscal Responsibility Law, which prohibited the Bank from issuing its own 
bonds after May 2002.  
  
Since August 2001, the shortage of bank reserves has been increasing because of the 
following factors: (i) the net selling of government securities, in particular those dollar-
indexed; (ii) the policy of daily sales of foreign exchange reserves by the Central Bank in the 
spot market; and (iii) the primary surpluses of the public sector. In December 2001, this 
shortage outpaced R$ 20 billion. As the initiative to provide or not bank reserves through 
open market operations stands on the Central Bank side, though there is a presumption that 
this would be the case, the shortage of reserves in the system facilitates the conduct of a tight 





The consolidation of the inflation targeting regime by no means ends the need for institutional 
reforms in Brazil. A fundamental aspect for monetary policy is the Central Bank’s autonomy 
with fixed-terms for its Board of Directors. This topic is currently being discussed in 
Congress as part of a broader bill that regulates the financial sector.    
 
Within the jurisdiction of the Central Bank, it is essential to maintain efforts to strengthen the 
financial sector in Brazil to face the challenges posed by innovations and developments in the 
market. The integration of the Brazilian economy, and especially its financial system, to the   16
world economy makes this objective key to improve competitiveness and to increase the 
resilience to external shocks. In this context, important actions have been taken to enhance 
prudential supervision and regulation. The strengthening of financial sector and of its 
prudential oversight by the Central Bank will allow further liberalization of the capital 
account.  
 
One important element in the reform agenda is the project to restructure the payments system, 
which will be fully implemented in April 2002. The main concern of the project is to reduce 
systemic risk and to transfer credit risk from the Central Bank to the private sector. The new 
payments system has been designed by adopting internationally accepted standards and 
practices, including: (i) a clear definition of the role of the Central Bank in the payments 
system and establishment of a well-founded legal basis to allow better risk control devices; 
(ii) set up of a large-value fund transfer system at the Central Bank operating on RTGS (Real 
Time Gross Settlement) basis and the monitoring of bank reserves in real time; (iii) enabling 
clearinghouses to ensure certainty of settlement through proper safeguard mechanisms; and 
(iv) clear definition of all the risks involved in every stage of the pre-settlement and 
settlement process. 
 
Other initiatives of reforms aimed at strengthening the financial sector include the stimulus to 
the market-making activity among market participants, the modernization of the bank’s 
insolvency procedures, the introduction of a new bankruptcy law, and the restructuring of 
housing credit system.    17
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